Court and Practice

What Australian courts decided, in plain English.

  • Issue 3
  • September and October 2026, a High Court issue
  • High Court of Australia
  • 6 decisions

Written for people about to start practising. What happened, why it matters, and what a junior would take from it. Free, and it stays free.

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All 18 decisions, newest first.

September and October 2026, a High Court issue

Issue 3 · High Court of Australia · 6 decisions

Litigation · Statutory Interpretation

Does a ban on prisoners using assisted reproductive technology stop a prisoner freezing her eggs?

Smith v Chief Executive, Queensland Corrective Services [2026] HCA 37

What happened

Ms Smith is a prisoner in Queensland who asked for approval to have her eggs extracted and frozen at her own cost. She will be 39 at her parole eligibility date and 41 when her sentence expires, and it was not disputed that her fertility will fall materially before release. The Chief Executive refused, because s 22(2) of the Corrective Services Act 2006 (Qld) stops a prisoner applying to participate in "assisted reproductive technology", a phrase the Act never defines. The Supreme Court of Queensland and the Court of Appeal both upheld the refusal.

What the court decided

The High Court unanimously allowed her appeal. Properly construed, "assisted reproductive technology" does not include egg extraction and freezing, which is technology that preserves fertility rather than technology that assists conception. Nothing in s 22(2) stops Ms Smith applying for the treatment so she can choose whether to have a child once she leaves prison.

Why it matters

Statutory interpretation decided whether a woman keeps the choice to have a child. The phrase was undefined, the dictionary meaning was broad, and the Court still read it narrowly, because context and purpose showed the ban was aimed at conceiving in custody, not at preserving fertility for later.

What a junior would take from it

When a statute leaves a phrase undefined, the ordinary meaning is the start of the argument, not the end of it. Work out what mischief the provision is aimed at before you tell a client what the words cover.

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Litigation · Criminal Procedure

Must a jury take the separation oath right before it first separates during deliberations?

The King v Bechaud [2026] HCA 36

What happened

At a Victorian rape trial the jurors took the separation oath at the start of the trial, before any evidence was called. After the jury retired, the judge twice allowed it to separate during deliberations, and it convicted on one charge. A majority of the Victorian Court of Appeal quashed the conviction, holding that s 50 of the Juries Act 2000 (Vic) required the oath to be taken at a time closely connected with the first separation during deliberations, and that taking it at the start was a fundamental irregularity.

What the court decided

The High Court unanimously allowed the Crown's appeal. Nothing in the text, context or purpose of s 50 requires the oath to be taken shortly before the separation power is first exercised. The precondition in s 50(2) asks only whether the jurors have taken the oath before the judge allows separation, which they had, so there was no substantial miscarriage of justice.

Why it matters

A Victorian conviction was restored because the High Court refused to read words into s 50 of the Juries Act that are not there. The oath was taken before the jury separated, which is all the section asks, so there was no irregularity at all, let alone a miscarriage of justice.

What a junior would take from it

Before you build an appeal point on a procedural slip, read the provision again and ask what it actually requires. The Court of Appeal majority found a fatal defect in a timing requirement that did not exist.

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Litigation · Administrative Law

Did approval of a coal mine expansion have to grapple with the mine's Scope 3 emissions?

MACH Energy Australia Pty Ltd v Denman Aberdeen Muswellbrook Scone Healthy Environment Group Inc [2026] HCA 35

What happened

The Independent Planning Commission of New South Wales approved MACH Energy's application to extend the Mount Pleasant open cut coal mine by 22 years and significantly expand it. Scope 3 emissions, the emissions from burning the coal elsewhere, made up 98 per cent of the project's predicted emissions, and the Commission imposed no conditions aimed at minimising them. A local environment group sought judicial review. The Land and Environment Court dismissed the application and the Court of Appeal overturned that decision.

What the court decided

The High Court dismissed the mine owner's appeal. The Court unanimously held the Commission had considered the development's likely local impacts as s 4.15(1)(b) of the EPA Act required, but by majority held the Commission failed to consider whether to impose conditions ensuring greenhouse gas emissions, including Scope 3 emissions, were minimised to the greatest extent practicable, as cl 2.20(1)(c) of the Resources SEPP required.

Why it matters

The mine owner lost not on the grand question of whether climate harm is a local impact, but on a mandatory consideration: a planning policy told the Commission to consider conditions minimising emissions to the greatest extent practicable, and it never did, for the 98 per cent of emissions that were Scope 3.

What a junior would take from it

In judicial review the narrow ground wins. Find the specific thing the statute or policy obliged the decision maker to consider, then show it never happened. Grand arguments make headlines; mandatory considerations quash decisions.

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Litigation · Administrative Law

When does a decision maker's reasoning become legally unreasonable, and how carefully must reasons be read before you say so?

Morton v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2026] HCA 38

What happened

A Singaporean permanent resident was refused a Return (Residence) visa on character grounds after drug importing and later offences. He argued the delegate ignored his evidence about access to medication, therapy and support for his health conditions in Singapore, denying him procedural fairness, and that the findings about the risk he posed to the community were legally unreasonable, illogical or irrational.

What the court decided

The High Court unanimously dismissed the application. Read as a whole, the delegate's reasons showed the Singapore treatment evidence was considered, and the risk findings were logically open on the material, including his history of offending. The catchwords carry the warning: reasons are not to be read with an eye keenly attuned to error.

Why it matters

Both attacks on the delegate's reasons failed because the High Court read the reasons as a whole. The treatment evidence had been considered, just not under the heading the plaintiff wanted, and the risk finding followed logically from the offending history.

What a junior would take from it

When you want to attack a decision maker's reasons, read the entire document first, twice. A point that dissolves when the reasons are read fairly and as a whole will cost your client an application and you your credibility.

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Commercial · Employment

Were a contractor's shotfirers in the black coal mining industry for portable long service leave, even though their employer was not a coal miner?

Coal Mining Industry (Long Service Leave Funding) Corporation v Orica Australia Pty Ltd [2026] HCA 30

What happened

Orica supplied shotfiring services at NSW open cut coal mines through its own employees. Whether it had to pay into the industry's portable long service leave scheme turned on whether those shotfirers were "eligible employees", a definition with two limbs, one about the employer and one about the location of the work. An award clause excludes shotfiring suppliers not otherwise engaged in the industry, and the Full Federal Court held that exclusion also limited the location limb, producing liability only for a window of dates.

What the court decided

The High Court allowed the Corporation's appeal by majority. The award exclusion applies only to the employer limb. Shotfirers whose duties were carried out at or about a place where black coal is mined, and who otherwise satisfied the location limb, were eligible employees at all relevant times, whoever their employer was.

Why it matters

A two limb definition only works if you keep the limbs apart. The award exclusion for shotfiring contractors belongs to the employer limb, so it could not be smuggled into the location limb to cut down who counts as working in the industry.

What a junior would take from it

When a definition has limbs, argue each one on its own terms and watch opponents who blur them. Here the blur was worth years of long service leave liability.

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Litigation · Appeals

What happens when an appeal court treats a point as common ground that was never actually conceded?

Haines v Attorney General of New South Wales [2026] HCA 34

What happened

Mr Haines had been a forensic patient since 2017 after being found unfit to be tried. A judge refused to extend his forensic patient status because the court was not satisfied of either limb of the statutory test. The Court of Appeal reinstated the extension, reasoning that one limb was common ground between the parties, and only the other limb was in dispute. It was not common ground.

What the court decided

In the High Court the Attorney General conceded the Court of Appeal had been wrong to treat the limb as agreed, and that the appeal had to succeed. The High Court unanimously allowed the appeal and set aside the extension order, with the consequence that Mr Haines is no longer a forensic patient. The reasons were published on 9 September 2026.

Why it matters

A man stayed a forensic patient because the Court of Appeal decided a statutory limb was common ground when it was not. The error was so clear that the Attorney General conceded the appeal in the High Court.

What a junior would take from it

Keep your own record of what was and was not conceded, in writing, at the hearing. Appeals get decided on what the court believes was common ground, and a wrong assumption can cost your client their liberty.

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1 to 17 September 2026

Issue 2 · Supreme Court of Victoria · 6 decisions

Litigation · Practice and Procedure

Can the court cap everyone's future costs without being asked?

Integrated Technologies Australia Pty Ltd v Lai [2026] VSC 559

What happened

A building dispute that started in VCAT and was transferred to the Supreme Court. The amounts claimed were modest and the issues were not complex, yet by June 2026 the owners had spent $328,677 on lawyers, the contractor $299,010 and the builder $68,701. The owners were on their third law firm. A Judicial Registrar ordered the contractor to give security for the owners' costs of $49,626.50 in two tranches, and, on her own motion, capped the future recoverable costs of every party at $94,160. The owners appealed. They said the power in s 65C(2)(d) of the Civil Procedure Act 2010 to cap costs in advance can only be used when a party asks for it, and that if there was to be a cap it should be $410,790, the figure their own costs consultant put on their future costs, about four times what the other parties expected to spend.

What the court decided

Appeal dismissed, with the owners to pay the costs of it. An appeal from a judicial registrar under r 84.05 is a hearing de novo, so Delany J decided the questions afresh while giving weight to the reasons below. The court can cap recoverable costs on its own motion: s 65C exists to further the overarching purpose, the factors in s 65C(2A) are a guide and not a checklist, and the Court of Appeal in Bare v Small said as much. The costs already incurred by the contractor and the owners each exceeded the amount in dispute, and s 24 of the Act imposes a positive obligation on the court to ensure costs are not excessive. The same cap was imposed on every party because the reasonable future work was much the same for each. His Honour also barred any further interlocutory application without leave, referred the parties to judicial mediation on 24 September, and left security payable in two tranches so a lump sum did not stultify the claim.

Why it matters

The court does not need to be asked before it caps costs. When what has been spent already exceeds what the case is worth, s 65C and the overarching purpose let a judge cap every party in advance, bar new applications and send everyone to mediation.

What a junior would take from it

Before you draft the next interlocutory application, put the costs to date next to the amount in dispute. If the first number is bigger, the court will notice, and it may be your client who pays for it.

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Litigation · Limitation of Actions

Twenty one years after the crash, could the claim still be brought?

Woodford v Fernando [2026] VSC 562

What happened

On 31 August 2004 Mr Fernando, then 36, was riding a motorcycle that collided with Ms Woodford's car at a stop sign in Melbourne. Police fined her for failing to give way. He suffered a serious degloving injury to his leg. The limitation period expired in September 2010. He believed for years that he was only entitled to no fault benefits, partly because he was told he had no licence to ride a motorcycle, and took no steps to find out whether he had a claim. In December 2025 an associate justice extended time under s 23A of the Limitation of Actions Act 1958, finding it just and reasonable to do so. Ms Woodford, now 79 and insured by the Transport Accident Commission, appealed to a judge.

What the court decided

Appeal dismissed. The Court of Appeal had just decided, in a five judge bench, that an appeal against an extension of time is governed by House v The King rather than the correctness standard, so Ms Woodford had to show a specific error or a decision that was plainly wrong. Gorton J accepted there were many features pointing against an extension: the delay was very long, the triple zero recordings were lost, possible eyewitnesses were gone, and an insurer should be able to assume it will not be asked to cover a 2004 accident. But the associate justice had weighed all of that and found a fair trial could still be held, because both drivers remember the crash, the injury is discrete and its effects are still ascertainable, and Mr Fernando's inaction was explained by a genuine belief he had no claim. There was no specific error and the decision was not plainly unjust, so the appeal could not succeed.

Why it matters

An extension of time is a discretion, and on appeal the question is not whether the judge would have decided differently but whether the associate justice made a specific error or was plainly wrong. A long delay with a genuine explanation, and an injury whose effects can still be assessed, can survive twenty one years.

What a junior would take from it

Learn the difference between an appeal by rehearing under House v The King and a hearing de novo. It decides what you have to prove before you open your mouth.

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Commercial · Contract and Equity

Can a family walk away from the deed it signed at mediation?

Trifonidis v Pantelidis [2026] VSC 565

What happened

A forty year family dispute over Melbourne and Preston properties held through a family trust and a company, Evancon. The plaintiffs, Arthur and Olga Trifonidis, had begun proceedings to wind up the trustee company. At a judicial mediation every family member and corporate vehicle signed a deed of settlement providing for the properties to be sold and the proceeds divided. Con and Mary Pantelidis and Evancon then refused to perform it. Representing themselves at trial, they argued the deed should be set aside for undue influence, because Con had given his brother in law Les authority to negotiate on the company's behalf, for unconscionable conduct, because of Con's health and because they had no legal advice before signing, and because damages would be an adequate remedy.

What the court decided

Specific performance ordered, and Con, Mary and Evancon to pay costs on a standard basis. Craig J found no relationship of dominance or ascendancy and that each of them exercised an independent and voluntary will, applying Thorne v Kennedy. Con's health did not affect his ability to judge his own interests, and the absence of legal advice was not a special disadvantage because nothing about the circumstances made advice a necessity. Damages were not adequate: the loss was hard to quantify and a money award would defeat the just and reasonable expectations the plaintiffs had under the deed, applying Dougan v Ley and the Court of Appeal in Parwan. His Honour also explained the trial judge's duty to a self represented party, which is to make sure they understand the case against them and can answer it, not to run it for them. Indemnity costs were refused despite a clause in the deed allowing a party to seek its costs of enforcement, and no costs order was made against Les, who had not opposed the relief.

Why it matters

A settlement deed signed at mediation is a contract like any other. Regret, a health condition, and choosing not to get advice are not undue influence or unconscionable conduct unless you can prove impaired judgment or a real special disadvantage that the other side exploited.

What a junior would take from it

When a client wants out of a deal they signed, the first question is not whether it was a good deal. It is whether there was a relationship of ascendancy or a disadvantage the other side knew about. If not, they will be ordered to perform it and pay costs.

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Commercial · Trusts and Solicitors

Who bears the onus when money leaves a solicitor's trust account?

Dal Broi v Nicholas James Lawyers Pty Ltd [2026] VSC 574

What happened

Mrs Dal Broi sold a Kew property for $6.36 million in 2017 and her solicitors, NJ Lawyers, received $2,240,747.28 of the proceeds into their trust account. Over the following weeks large sums left the account: $600,000 and $25,408 to repay a loan from a company controlled by the sole director of the firm, $500,000 and later $200,000 into that director's investment vehicle, NJ Capital, which lent client money to property developers. She said she never authorised most of it. The firm said she did, or that her husband did on her behalf, and that she had been enthusiastic about investing with NJ Capital. Contracts for the $500,000 investment were requested but never sent or signed. The firm also under reported the proceeds by $30,000, which went into NJ Capital and was used to pay fees and other bills, and the director admitted he never told her.

What the court decided

Most of the claim failed and one part succeeded. Her Honour was not satisfied Mrs Dal Broi had discharged the onus on the $642,924.04 loan repayment claim, the $500,000 claim or the $200,000 claim. She had signed the loan agreement, had made appropriate concessions when shown documents, could not recall key events, had pressed for the investment in writing, and the $200,000 had been applied on her husband's instructions to his Gosford development. The $30,000 was different: the firm's own reconciliation misstated the amount received, the money was moved out on the third day, and the director conceded he never told her. She discharged the onus on that sum. The court will hear the parties on orders, interest and costs.

Why it matters

Where a client says money left the trust account without authority, the client carries the onus of proving it. Documents she signed, emails she sent and instructions her husband gave all counted against her, except for the one sum the firm had misreported and never mentioned.

What a junior would take from it

Trust money is the thing that ends careers. If you ever handle it, every movement needs a written instruction from the client, not a conversation, and never a relative. Read this one before your first trust account reconciliation.

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Litigation · Practice and Procedure

Can you strike out a proportionate liability defence before trial?

BlueCross Community Care Services Group v Buxton Constructions [2026] VSC 581

What happened

BlueCross sued its builder, Buxton, in contract, and its architect, BLP, in contract and negligence, for the cost of fixing defects in a new aged care facility in Box Hill. BLP pleaded that if it was liable, the claim was an apportionable claim under Part IVAA of the Wrongs Act 1958 and Buxton was a concurrent wrongdoer, so BLP's liability had to be limited to its share. Buxton had recently gone into liquidation. BlueCross applied under r 23.02(a) to strike out the defence as futile, arguing that because it had pleaded only a contract claim against Buxton, and not a claim for failure to take reasonable care, Buxton could not be a concurrent wrongdoer at all.

What the court decided

Application dismissed. The strike out threshold is high, and on an interlocutory application the question is only whether the defence is arguable, not whether it will win. Her Honour found genuine doubt and debate in the authorities on two points: whether a person is a concurrent wrongdoer only where an apportionable claim is actually pleaded against them, and whether the court looks only at the pleaded claims or also at what might be found at trial about a failure to take reasonable care. Tanah Merah did not settle either question in the way BlueCross said. With that uncertainty, the defence was at least arguable and could not be called futile. Costs to be argued.

Why it matters

Strike out is for defences that cannot succeed, not defences that might not. Where the authorities on Part IVAA are genuinely unsettled, a proportionate liability defence stays in and the argument happens at trial.

What a junior would take from it

The test on a strike out is arguable, not persuasive. If you can find two lines of authority pointing different ways, you have already won the application.

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Litigation · Evidence

Can a defendant read the plaintiff's psychologist's notes?

Hubicki v Australia Air League Inc [2026] VSC 596

What happened

Mr Hubicki sues the Australia Air League for damages for childhood sexual abuse by one of its volunteers. The League admits the abuse occurred but denies it knew, and does not admit he suffered psychiatric injury. He had been seeing a psychologist since 2022, originally about workplace harassment, and did not disclose the abuse to her for some time. The League subpoenaed her notes and applied under ss 32C and 32D of the Evidence (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1958 for leave to inspect them. The court read the notes itself, with the parties' agreement, before deciding.

What the court decided

Application dismissed. The notes are confidential communications within s 32B whether the definition is read literally or in the narrower way preferred in earlier single judge decisions, and his Honour preferred the literal reading, because the words 'whether before or after the acts constituting the offence' would otherwise have little work to do. Leave requires substantial probative value, no other evidence of similar or greater value, and a public interest in disclosure that substantially outweighs the interest in confidentiality. The League already had the psychologist's report, the psychiatrist's report and its own expert, so evidence of similar or greater probative value was available, and disclosure would undermine the therapeutic relationship. It was not in the public interest to allow inspection. KR v BR and the Court of Appeal's 2026 decision in Coker-Godson applied.

Why it matters

Counselling notes of an abuse survivor are protected, and a defendant who already holds the treating report and its own expert evidence will not get them. The court read the notes itself and decided the public interest was against disclosure.

What a junior would take from it

Subpoenaing therapy records is not a fishing exercise you get for free. You need substantial probative value, no other way to get it, and a public interest that outweighs confidentiality. Know ss 32B to 32D before you draft the subpoena.

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Week of 3 August 2026

Issue 1 · Supreme Court of Victoria · 6 decisions

Litigation · Administration and Probate

Was the administrator removed?

Stagliano v Lyttleton [2026] VSC 494

What happened

The deceased died intestate in September 2019, leaving a blended family: four children of a first marriage, his widow and her daughter. The widow was granted letters of administration but was removed by consent in July 2022 and replaced by an experienced estat…

What the court decided

No. The application was dismissed and the administrator remains in office. Ginnane J applied the principle stated by Dixon J: the jurisdiction is exercised with a view to the interests of the beneficiaries, the security of the estate property and the efficient execution of the trusts and the question is whether the considerations combine to show that the welfare of the beneficiaries is opposed to the officeholder's continued occupation of the office. The delay had legitimate explanations. The administrator inherited the estate from a removed predecessor, spent the first eighteen months obtaining files and litigating a threshold question about the characterisation of estate assets decided by Harris J in February 2025, then sold the principal property for $4.7 million on supporting valuations. Of five proceedings concerning this estate, three were brought by the plaintiff himself: he lodged a caveat that blocked the sale and was ordered to pay indemnity costs when it was removed and his injunction application was dismissed with costs. His Honour accepted there was "some justification" for thinking more decisive action could have been taken on the rent question, but found no breach of duty established. No other beneficiary sought removal and one sister wrote opposing the plaintiff's appointment on the basis it would add further time.

Why it matters

Removing an administrator is about the beneficiaries and the estate, not about whether a disappointed beneficiary can list things that could have gone faster. Delay with a legitimate explanation is not a breach of duty.

What a junior would take from it

Before you advise a client to apply to remove anyone, ask what the other beneficiaries want and whether the delay has a reason. Here three of the five proceedings were the applicant's own.

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Litigation · Practice and Procedure

Was the amendment allowed?

5 Boroughs v Victoria [2026] VSC 496

What happened

This COVID business-losses group proceeding was commenced by writ in August 2020, with a group definition indorsed on the writ. A statement of claim filed in February 2021 described the group in materially different terms. Leave under s 33K of the Supreme Cour…

What the court decided

Yes, but not on the footing the parties advanced and only after 18,227 group members were notified. Watson J declined to accept the amendment was one of form only. Supplying services "from" premises is at least arguably broader than supplying services to persons who attend those premises: a plumbing business supplies from its premises while the work occurs at the client's. At the very least, His Honour found, the original definition was ambiguous. Leave was granted on the discretionary balance: ambiguity in a group definition must be resolved, given the importance of clarity and ascertainability; the proceeding had been conducted this way for five years; and of the 11 objections received, it was not clear that any objector was in fact affected. Those who might be excluded suffered no prejudice, since no claim had been advanced on their behalf since February 2021 and each retains the right to sue individually. Notably, His Honour refused retrospective effect to 12 February 2021, despite both parties consenting, because it would strip any excluded member of five years of limitation suspension under s 33ZE.

Why it matters

A group definition that is ambiguous has to be fixed, and consent between the parties does not settle what happens to the people the fix excludes. The court refused retrospective effect precisely to protect their limitation position.

What a junior would take from it

Read the definition on the writ against the one in the statement of claim. If they differ, that is a problem for the whole proceeding, not a drafting nicety.

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Commercial · Corporations: Insolvency

Was the director personally liable?

Crispino v Lightowler [2026] VSC 500

What happened

The liquidators of a container transport company pursued its sole director under s 588G. The company changed accounting platforms in January 2019 and retained nothing from before that date. What survived afterwards was arguably worse than nothing: negative lia…

What the court decided

Yes. Judgment for $2,504,836.99. Matthews J held the s 588E(4) presumption arose for both periods: for the pre-2019 period because no records were retained contrary to s 286(2) and for the post-2019 period because what was kept did not correctly record or explain the company's transactions and position under s 286(1). The presumption was unrebutted. Actual insolvency was separately established from at least 2 August 2023 on the Plymin indicia, which in turn engaged the s 588E(3) presumption back to 2 November 2022. No s 588H defence was ever pleaded. Notably, the Court did not simply accept the claimed total. A $19,429.78 default fee and $42,400 in recourse fees charged by a financier were disallowed as liabilities incurred after the administration date, applying the substance-and-commercial-reality test from ASIC v Plymin.

Why it matters

No books means the company is presumed insolvent, and switching accounting systems is not an excuse for keeping nothing from before. The court also checked the liquidator's arithmetic and struck out fees incurred after administration.

What a junior would take from it

The s 588E(4) presumption does the heavy lifting in a director case. Establish the record-keeping failure first; actual insolvency evidence is the backup, not the lead.

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Commercial · Corporations: Insolvency

Was he liable as a de facto director?

Re Perrydotcom Pty Ltd [2026] VSC 504

What happened

The company operated Campari House, a rooftop bar and restaurant in Hardware Lane, Melbourne. The respondent was its sole director and shareholder until August 2015, when the ASIC register recorded that he ceased to be a director. His brother-in-law was record…

What the court decided

Yes. Gobbo AsJ found he acted in the position of a director throughout and was a de facto director within limb (b)(i) of the s 9AC definition. Applying Grimaldi v Chameleon Mining (No 2) and DCT v Austin, the question is one of fact and characterisation: had the person performed functions one would reasonably expect of a director of that company, given its circumstances? Her Honour noted DCT v Austin, where a submission that a former director was merely helping as a friend was rejected, the length of time he so acted putting the matter beyond that realm. On the liquidator's unchallenged evidence the company was insolvent from at least 30 June 2019 and the SRO and ATO notices arriving at his own post office box, including an "Urgent Notice Legal Action Pending", established actual awareness of grounds for suspecting it. The s 588H defences failed at the threshold of proof: he filed witness outlines for himself and three others, then called no one, gave no evidence and did not cross-examine the liquidator. Her Honour gave the outlines no weight and drew the Jones v Dunkel inference. Compensation of $2,115,967 was ordered under s 588M, with a further $802,342 on his loan ledger (prima facie proved under s 1305) and $780,582 against his company Garrick.

Why it matters

Resigning on the ASIC register changes nothing if you keep doing the job. Filing witness outlines and then calling no one hands the court a Jones v Dunkel inference.

What a junior would take from it

The test is functional: what did this person actually do, for how long, and would you expect a director of this company to do it? Evidence you announce and then do not call is worse than none.

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Commercial · Corporations: Winding Up

Did the company avoid winding up?

In the matter of WMU Pty Ltd [2026] VSC 505

What happened

A flooring supplier served a statutory demand for $565,546.90, the unpaid balance under a Deed of Acknowledgment and Repayment the parties had signed after an earlier demand. The company applied to set the demand aside on grounds of duress, disputed deliveries…

What the court decided

No. Barrett AsJ refused leave, found solvency unproven, declined the stay and wound the company up. On leave: s 459S(2) is a mandatory precondition, the ground must be material to proving solvency. Applying the narrow approach in Switz Pty Ltd v Glowbind Pty Ltd (2000) 48 NSWLR 661, a company that contends it is solvent regardless of the disputed debt cannot satisfy the materiality requirement. The director's own affidavit closed that gateway. On solvency: the accounts were unaudited special-purpose compilations bearing assurance disclaimers and going-concern qualifications; shareholder loans of $612,669 were on unknown terms; and the director's undertaking of continuing financial support was unparticularised. Per Expile v Jabb's Excavations, the fullest and best evidence is required. On the stay: the related proceeding was in its infancy, further unsecured costs would accumulate and a stay would subvert the policy of s 459S itself.

Why it matters

Leave under s 459S is a real gate, not a formality. A company that says it is solvent regardless of the disputed debt has just told the court the debt is not material, which is the one thing it needed to show.

What a junior would take from it

Solvency needs the fullest and best evidence: audited accounts, loan terms, a particularised undertaking. Unaudited compilations with disclaimers are an admission dressed as evidence.

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Litigation · Practice and Procedure

Was security ordered in the amount sought?

A.J. Tuohey v Voloshin [2026] VSC 507

What happened

The first defendant, sued by three corporate plaintiffs over a failed wave-energy investment, applied for security for his costs in the sum of $64,789.26, relying on r 62.02 of the Supreme Court (General Civil Procedure) Rules 2025 (Vic) and s 1335 of the Corp…

What the court decided

Security was ordered, but in the substituted sum of $35,820.89, barely half the amount sought. Fary AsJ applied Livingspring Pty Ltd v Kliger Partners: "reason to believe" a plaintiff cannot pay is a low jurisdictional threshold requiring a rational basis and a practical risk assessment, not proof. Applying Harpur v Ariadne (No 2), where multiple plaintiffs sue in the same interest, capacity in any one defeats the application against all, but here none could demonstrate it. Quantum was where the applicant lost ground. His three-month delay told against past costs, which were also unitemised; his Honour discounted them by 50 per cent rather than the 18 per cent proposed. His written submissions had also mistakenly applied the discount to actual rather than standard costs. Future costs to mediation were discounted 20 per cent. Result: $8,845.24 past plus $26,975.65 future.

Why it matters

Security for costs was ordered, but the applicant lost half the amount by delaying three months, not itemising past costs, and getting the discount arithmetic wrong in his own submissions.

What a junior would take from it

Quantum is where security applications are won and lost. Move early, itemise, and check every figure against the standard basis before the submissions leave your desk.

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